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Understanding change in professional road cycling   
 
Abstract 
 
The decision in 2005 of the world governing body of cycling, the Union Cycliste 
Internationale (UCI), to introduce a new competition, the UCI Pro Tour, was a highly 
significant development in the professional road cycling. Using this development as 
the case study setting, this paper seeks to illustrate stakeholder theory and network 
theory at work in a changing environment. Drawing on a series of semi-structured 
interviews with key stakeholders, complemented by analysis of publicly available 
information, this study explores how the process of change has affected the 
professional road cycling network, the interaction between its stakeholders and the 
balance of power among those stakeholders. While commercialism has a long history 
in professional road cycling, the paper concludes that the change process has been 
driven by a wish for commercial deepening within the network and of a desire to 
challenge some of the well-established relationships and dependencies that have 
existed therein.  
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Introduction 
 
In 2005, the world governing body of cycling, the Union Cycliste Internationale 
(UCI) replaced its World Series of professional road cycling race events with a new 
competition - the UCI Pro Tour. While season-long competitions had been in place 
since 1948 (Desbordes, 2008), the Pro Tour was a radical change in that it sought to 
create a super league in professional road cycling, in which all of the best riders and 
the best events, and in particular the three major stage races, the Grand Tours, were 
included. Initially presented as an opportunity to modernise the sport and to develop 
it as an industry, the organisational structure of professional road cycling, combined 
with its peculiar economic structure, has resulted in the Pro Tour becoming the focus 
of a bitter power struggle between stakeholders in professional road cycling. In 
particular, the dispute between major race organisers (such as the Amaury Sports 
Organization (ASO), organisers of the Tour de France, cycling’s highest profile event) 
and the UCI has threatened the very existence of the sport. 
 
In this paper, professional road cycling is characterised as a stakeholder network; a 
series of actors or stakeholders connected by a set of ties. Figure 1 provides a 
representation of the stakeholders involved in the network and of the main 
relationships that exist between those stakeholders. For many of the stakeholder 
relationships indicated, to some extent at least there is influence in both directions 
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therein. As appropriate the thickness of the lines has been used to indicate the most 
central and important relationships. 
 
 
Figure 1. The organisational structure of professional road cycling 
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LEGEND 
UCI Pro Tour  governed by the UCI Pro Tour Council; it manages the UCI Pro Tour on 
behalf of the UCI. 
AIGCP  International Association of Professional Cycling Groups (umbrella 
organisation for the cycling teams). 
CPA Association of Professional Cyclists (umbrella organisation for the riders). 
AIOCC International Association of Organizers of Cycling Races (umbrella 
organisation for the race organisers). 
 
The aim of the paper is to illustrate theory in the context of change within 
professional road cycling; using that theory to demonstrate the changing 
configuration of the professional road cycling network and its characteristics.  While 
stakeholder theory is the dominant theoretical perspective used in the paper to 
illustrate change, its nature, coupled with the structure of professional road cycling, 
means that a number of closely related theoretical approaches relating to network 
theory, power and political economy are also drawn on.   
 
The paper is structured as follows: The first section draws on the existing literature to 
provide a theoretical background for the case study. With this in mind, the next 
section presents the contextual background to the study, namely the introduction of 
the UCI Pro Tour.  This provides the setting for the case study and leads into the 
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section justifying the methodology and methods adopted in this paper. Rather than 
seek to advance theory based on the feature of this particular case, instead this paper 
uses the case study and its findings to illustrate theory. This forms the basis of the 
next section of the paper, followed by the conclusions. 
 
Theoretical Background 
 
While the origins of stakeholder philosophy can be traced to the early nineteenth 
century and the early forms of co-operative industrial organisations promoted by 
entrepreneurs and social reformers like Robert Owen in New Lanark (Clarke, 1998), 
it was the somewhat more recent publication in 1984 of Edward Freeman’s book 
Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, which integrated stakeholder 
concepts into a coherent construct and acted as the catalyst for the proliferation of 
stakeholder-based literature spanning various academic subject areas.  
 
Freeman defined a stakeholder as ‘any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives’ (1984, 46). While the 
definition is not universally accepted and has been criticised as being so broad that it 
is meaningless (Sternberg, 1999), it, or some modification thereof, has been utilised by 
many researchers. Within stakeholder-based research, considerable emphasis has 
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been placed on the identification of stakeholders and on determining the types of 
influence that they exert (Rowley, 1997).  
 
Stakeholder management techniques have been identified as being of value to sport 
managers in trying to achieve their objectives in sports organisations ranging from 
global sporting organisations through to community-based clubs (Friedman et al., 
2004). A number of authors have used stakeholder theory and stakeholder 
management to analyse behaviour and objectives in sport-based organisations 
including major events (Parent, 2008; Parent & Séguin, 2007), inter-collegiate 
athletics (Wolfe & Putler, 2002), public funding for professional sports facilities 
(Friedman & Mason, 2004) and franchise relocation (Mason & Slack, 1997). Several 
studies of professional football clubs have also explored the relevance of stakeholder 
theory as a way of explaining behaviour in an industry undergoing dramatic change, 
most notably change arising from the substantial increases in income and financial 
rewards available in that sport since the early 1990s (Farquhar et al., 2005; Hamil et 
al., 1999; Holt, 2007; Morrow, 1999, 2003; Senaux, 2008). While stakeholders in 
football clubs have probably never had a unitary objective - despite simplistic rhetoric 
about success (Stewart, 1986) - the business transformation has resulted in the 
objectives of stakeholders in contemporary clubs becoming more diverse than ever 
(Morrow, 2003). This point is reinforced by Senaux (2008) who argues that the 
generic description of utility maximisation masks a serious of complex and often 
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incompatible stakeholder goals. Wolfe and Putler (2002) extend this by challenging 
the implicit assumption within stakeholder theory, that priorities within role-based 
stakeholder groups, rather than between stakeholder groups, are relatively 
homogeneous.   
 
Much of the early literature on stakeholder theory was organisation-centric 
(Friedman & Miles, 2002); characterised in terms of separate, ‘hub and spoke’ 
relationships between an organisation and its stakeholders; understanding how 
individual stakeholders influence an organisation’s operations (Freeman, 1984). 
Increasingly, it was recognised that an understanding of how organisations respond to 
those influences and a consideration of the multiple, complex and interdependent 
interactions that simultaneously exist in stakeholder environments was also required 
(Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Friedman & Miles, 2002; Neville & Menguc, 2006; Rowley, 
1997). In their paper on the organisation of a major swimming event, Parent and 
Séguin (2007) suggest that stakeholder theory is a good theoretical framework to use 
when examining multiple perspectives inherent therein. 
 
Of particular interest in this study is understanding how the changing positions of 
stakeholders within a particular social structure influence their behaviour (Marsden, 
1990). Rowley (1997) used social network analysis to describe how organisations are 
embedded within a relational network of stakeholders, and how the network’s nature 
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and the organisation’s position therein influenced its response to stakeholder 
demands. He identified two factors that were central in explaining an organisation’s 
degree of resistance to stakeholder demands: network centrality - the position of an 
actor in a network relative to other actors; and network density - the level of 
connectedness between actors within the network.  
 
Power is an important concept in the application of stakeholder theory to 
relationships in a sporting network and in understanding those relationships. While 
many definitions of power exist, an appropriate starting point is Weber’s (1947) 
definition that actors in a social relationship possess power when they have the ability 
to exercise their own will, despite resistance. This focus on power as an attribute of an 
individual stakeholder can be seen as problematic as it does not consider the 
possibility that power may arise out of the social relationships between stakeholders 
(Martin, 1971), relationships that are often multi-faceted and inter-dependent 
(Emerson, 1962). Frooman (1999) suggests that power can also be an attribute of a 
relationship between the stakeholders, rather than of the stakeholders themselves. 
The importance of relationships in understanding power within a stakeholder 
network is also identified by Neville and Menguc (2006), whose theoretical 
framework on stakeholder interactions and influence - stakeholder multiplicity - 
takes into account three things: that stakeholder groups can both compete against 
each other and complement each other; that stakeholders can form strategic alliances 
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to increase the persuasive power of their claim; and that their potential to influence 
an organisation is often influenced by their role.  
 
Podolny and Page (1998) characterise an organisational network [in governance 
terms] as a collection of stakeholders who have repeating and enduring exchange 
relations with each other but who lack appropriate legitimate organisational authority 
through which to resolve disputes that arise through their exchange processes. In this 
type of network it would be expected that power would be more dependent on things 
like network structure, position and stakeholder relationships within the network 
(Rowley, 1997; Brass et al., 1998).  
 
Henry and Lee (2002) use football to illustrate the changing nature of governance and 
models of power. A largely hierarchical structure in which governing bodies 
exercised power through their positions has been replaced by an interactive web-
based system of systemic governance, one dependent on inter-relationships between 
stakeholders in which different groups exert power in different ways and in different 
contexts by drawing on alliances with other stakeholders. For example, increased 
commercialism and an increased focus on finance have strengthened the power of 
stakeholders including individual leagues, major clubs and broadcasters, and have 
facilitated the construction of alliances between them. Holt (2007) characterises 
European football as a stakeholder network, where power is distributed across a 
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number of stakeholders, no single one of which will have a monopoly on change.  He 
argues that UEFA, European football’s governing body, has attempted to manage this 
situation by constructing a stakeholder democracy, integrating clubs, leagues and 
players into the governance system but without giving up genuine decision-making 
power. To date, he argues, UEFA has been able to do this because of its commercial 
and sporting control over the lucrative Champions’ League. 
 
Of course, power is not a fixed commodity and nor are the structure or relationships 
in any network. In particular, any change in stakeholder recognition or behaviour 
may alter the degree of connectedness between stakeholders in the network and/or 
the exchange processes that exist between them. This shifting balance of power in a 
sports network was examined by Wolfe et al. (2002), within the working of a sport 
network in Ireland.  Their study illustrated the success of satellite television in 
achieving a central position of power within the network and of changing the 
distribution of power within the network through its management of relationships 
and in particular through its key role as a distribution source for revenues throughout 
the network.  Consistent with the previous examples on football, commercialism in 
the form of commercial deepening, where media rights become a more significant 
source of revenue, has played an important part in changing the distribution of power 
within a particular network. The increased commercialism and focus on finance 
within sport generally (Schimmel, 2005), is of particular interest when considering 
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global sporting organisations and their role within stakeholder networks, given that 
the traditional focus of these bodies has been on non-financial objectives  (Forster & 
Pope, 2004).  
 
Contextual Background 
 
The UCI administers the regulation of all cycling disciplines including mountain 
biking, track cycling, cyclo-cross, BMX and para-cycling, as well as professional road 
cycling - the focus of this paper.  Founded in 1900 by the national cycling 
organisations of Belgium, USA, France, Italy and Switzerland, the UCI has not, 
however, always held governance over all aspects of cycling.  Separate amateur and 
professional cycling federations were developed in 1965, with the largest body, the 
International Federation of Amateur Cycling, dealing with the Olympic Games.  
Although the UCI acted as the co-ordinating body for both, they remained separate 
until 1992 when the two bodies were reunified back into the UCI. Within 
professional road cycling, the UCI oversees competitive events and its regulatory role 
includes: licensing racers and races, the provision of referees and adjudicators, and the 
enforcement of disciplinary rules, most notably for doping.   
 
Professional road cycling has a long history. Its development began with the birth of 
the Belgian and French ‘Classic’ races such as the Liège-Bastogne-Liège (first staged as 
 13
a professional event in 1894), Paris-Roubaix (1896) and Paris-Brussels (also 1896). The 
sport’s highest profile event, The Tour de France, a 3-week stage race that takes place 
in July every year on public roads across France, was first staged in 1903. The Italian 
equivalent, the Giro d’Italia, first took place in 1909 while the inaugural Vuelta a 
España was held in 1935. Known as the three Grand Tours, these three-week stage 
races are widely regarded as the foundation upon which modern day professional 
cycling is built. Recognised as the ultimate endurance events, the three main tours are 
celebrated as social and cultural tributes to their host countries and are subjects of 
intense national pride and prestige (Dauncey & Hare, 2003). While the basic structure 
of these stage races is largely unaltered, there have been major changes in the way in 
which they are run, financed and controlled. For example, the Tour de France was 
run for competing nations prior to the introduction of the commercial publicity 
caravan and private sponsorship of individual teams in 1930. However, from the 
perspective of the sport as a whole, that these and similar races and events continue to 
be the central components of today’s professional road calendar demonstrates the 
unchanging nature of the sport. In view of this, the establishment in 2005 of the UCI 
Pro Tour is a highly significant change in the sport.  
 
Professional road cycling is a sport founded on commercialism. The early classic races 
rapidly captured the interest of the spectating public and business sponsors were 
quick to see the commercial potential in being involved with stage races. Several 
 14
famous races were founded by newspapers as publicity events to boost their 
circulation (L’Auto, Tour de France; Gazzetta dello Sport, Giro d’Italia;  
Informaciones, Vuelta a España), while the Tour de France’s publicity caravan was 
introduced in 1930s as a means of encouraging private sector finance into the sport 
(Desbordes, 2006).  
 
Professional road cycling is essentially a private sector sport. The Grand Tours are 
owned and managed by commercial organisations. Most prominent is Amaury Sports 
Organisation, which arranges the Tour de France, by the far the wealthiest and most 
important cycling race in the world. Its turnover in 2006 was €145.8m (AS0, 2007) of 
which about 70% is derived from cycling (Desbordes, 2006). Historically, it has been a 
very powerful participant within professional cycling through its control of the team 
invitations to the Tour. Under this structure, teams - and by extension sponsors and 
riders - were largely beholden to major race organizers like ASO which controlled 
entry to their events. This dependency was a major problem for teams negotiating 
with potential sponsors, as clearly they could not provide the sponsors with a 
guarantee as to the visibility of their brand, thereby introducing uncertainty in terms 
of a sponsor’s expected financial return (Desbordes, 2006).  As sponsorship provides 
almost all of a team’s income, this uncertainty had major implications for a team’s 
ability to pay its riders and cover operational costs. 
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Race organisers’ turnover comes from television rights, sponsorship and advertising, 
and from public funds (fees paid by local and regional councils to host stages of the 
race). For example, the City of London paid approximately €4m to host the PreTour 
and the first two stages of the Tour de France in 2007. Unlike other professional 
sports, because races take place on public roads, no revenue is derived through gate 
receipts. Moreover, professional road cycling is an unusual mixture of individual and 
team sport, with individual cyclists employed by private teams who are funded by 
sponsors. (For an overview of the economics of professional road cycling, see 
Desbordes, 2006; 2008; Morrow & Idle, 2008; Rebeggiani & Tondani, 2008). 
 
In 2005, the UCI replaced its World Series of professional road cycling race events 
with a new competition, the UCI Pro Tour. Made up of 27, mainly classic races 
within the European professional road cycling calendar, the most prestigious events - 
such as the three Grand Tours - were included in the Pro Tour, in addition to some 
lesser-known races.  To take part in Pro Tour events, cycling teams must apply to the 
UCI for a Pro Tour licence, which is ordinarily valid for 4 years. The Pro Tour is an 
oligopoly, with the UCI acting as the regulatory agency that owns the monopoly of 
the licences (Rebeggiani & Tondani, 2008). Only twenty teams are granted a Pro Tour 
licence, with each team then being obliged to send riders to compete in all 27 Pro 
Tour races, although they are allowed to draw on different riders for different events. 
The main difference from the previous system is that the Pro Tour is a closed 
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structure with usually only two ‘wildcard’ places granted to continental teams with 
best performances over the season.  According to the UCI, the Pro Tour has three 
main objectives: 
 
• to make cycling more attractive to the public, especially by improving 
participation levels at key events of the season. 
• to increase the interest that cycling generates with investors, by offering 
teams, organizers, broadcasters and their main partners, guarantees as regards 
the profit that they will make from their investment. 
• to contribute to the development of cycling on all continents. 
 
The UCI Pro Tour ran for the first time in 2005. While the original concept of change 
was widely supported by various stakeholders involved in cycling (including the 
major race organisers), its subsequent creation has been controversial with 
widespread evidence of stakeholder conflict (set out in the following results and 
discussion section). The UCI and the organisers of the three Grand Tours were unable 
to reach agreement on the format of 2006 UCI ProTour, such that the status of some 
of the events within the Tour was unclear.  In simple terms, the UCI Pro Tour 
included events for which the race organisers had not sought Pro Tour licences. 
Nevertheless, Alejandro Valverde was crowned Pro Tour champion although even his 
moment of glory was overshadowed when RCS, organisers of the Giro d’Italia (one of 
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the organisers which had not sought a Pro Tour licence), refused to allow him to be 
awarded the Pro Tour jersey at its event. The dispute became more heated in the lead 
up to the 2007 UCI Pro Tour.  Only days before the start of the first event of the 
competition series, the Paris-Nice race, it seemed certain that the event would not 
take place at all after race organisers, ASO, refused to allow some of the Pro Tour 
licensed teams to participate.  This refusal was made on the grounds that, as it had 
made no application to the UCI for its race to be licensed as a Pro Tour event, ASO 
was at liberty to invite whichever cycling teams it wished to take part in its event. 
The UCI responded by refusing to provide governing body officials to regulate the 
event.  Unperturbed, ASO claimed it would run the race as a national event, without 
UCI backing, with referees from the French cycling federation officiating instead. As 
the remarkable ‘tit-for-tat’ exchange continued, this decision resulted in the UCI 
instructing all Pro Tour teams not to participate in ASO events.  The cycling teams 
then issued public statements calling for the organisers and UCI to resolve the dispute 
for the good of cycling (Morrow & Idle, 2008). At the eleventh hour a compromise 
was reached. (More detailed background information is available at 
www.cyclingweekly.co.uk News Archive).    
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Method 
 
Setting 
 
The setting for this paper is the network related to professional road cycling. More 
specifically, within this network the focus of the paper is on the change which 
resulted in the setting up of the UCI Pro Tour, as set out in the preceding section. 
This research has focused on the period since 2002 when the first formal noting of 
major organisational change was made (minutes of the PCC (Professional Cycling 
Council), No. 7/2002, set out in Official News Bulletin, No. 36, January 2003).  
 
The aim of this paper is to use this case study to illustrate theory at work, in particular 
stakeholder theory and network theory. Case studies are recognised as being of 
particular value in providing detailed knowledge of complex events as they develop 
over time (Parent & Séguin, 2007). Case study research involves the investigation of a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1984). Case studies are particularly useful in 
looking at the application of stakeholder and network theories as they provide an 
opportunity to consider not just the voice and perspective of stakeholders, but also of 
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the relevant groups of stakeholders and of the interaction between them (Tellis, 
1997).  
 
Data collection 
 
There were two data collection approaches in this case study: a) gathering data from 
archival material, and b) semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders.  
 
The first of these approaches involved collection of secondary data obtained mainly 
through analysis of publicly available information related to the UCI, available either 
at its headquarters in Aigle, Switzerland or on-line. This information included: 
 
- financial statements of the UCI for the years 1999/2000 – 2003/04; 
- budgets presented to the UCI annual congress for the years 2002-2006 
(inclusive); 
- legal and constitutional documents, such as the UCI Constitution and its Rules 
for Good Governance; 
- records and minutes of its activities and decision making in various 
committees as set out in its Official News Bulletins. The Official News 
Bulletins covered the period from January 2003 (No. 36) until April 2006 (No. 
45). 
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In addition, detailed study was carried out of cycling-specific sources, in particular 
the UK-based Cycling Weekly magazine, but also internet-based cycling sites such as 
Cycling News (www.cyclingnews.com).  This material was used to better understand 
the structure of professional road cycling, the role of the various stakeholders, their 
involvement in the restructuring discussions and processes, and their attitudes to the 
proposed restructuring.   
 
In a study in 2003, O’Brien and Slack analysed structure and change in the 
organisational field of English Rugby Union. Their approach involved identifying an a 
priori coding scheme based on a number of signposts to indicate shifting logics or 
change in the field, specifically changes in: actors or stakeholders, exchange processes 
and inter-organisational linkages, legitimised forms of capital, and regulatory 
structure (O’Brien & Slack, 2003). In this study, the themes that best illustrated 
change within the professional road cycling network were drawn from the review of 
literature, coupled with the analysis of the archival material. This provided three key 
themes: 1) changes in stakeholder nature, 2) changes in power and 3) changes in 
stakeholder linkages and coalitions. In addition, an important over-arching theme of 
commercialism was identified. 
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The second source was primary data obtained from a series of semi-structured 
interviews held with key stakeholders in professional road cycling. An important 
challenge in using interview data is to limit bias (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). To 
mitigate bias, interviewee selection reflected their anticipated knowledge of 
professional road cycling and the setting up of the Pro Tour, and their markedly 
different roles within cycling, which it was hoped would illuminate diverse 
perspectives on the sport and the changes therein. Stakeholders from the network 
interviewed included representatives from the governing body, from race organisers, 
from teams, from umbrella organisations and with relevant individuals not directly 
involved in professional road cycling, such as journalists. Within the governing body, 
interviews were held with representatives from different levels within the 
organisation. To that end, interviews were conducted with representatives of the UCI 
(the President, the Pro Tour Manager, the Press Officer), ASO (the Chief Executive of 
the Tour de France), RCS (the Director of Organisation of the Giro d’Italia), the 
Administrative Director of a UCI Pro Tour Cycling team and the Professional 
Cyclists’ Association. These interviews lasted for between 60 and 90 minutes each on 
average. In addition, two shorter interviews were held with editorial staff of two UK-
based cycling magazines. Interviews were held between May 2006 and January 2007 
with several of the interviews being conducted in French or Italian by one of the 
authors. While the number of interviews is relatively small, the main interviewees, 
all of whom were based in continental Europe, are representative of the key 
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stakeholders in the professional road cycling network. All interviewees provided their 
consent for their views to be reported in academic publications. 
 
Questions focused on the themes identified as illustrating change within professional 
road cycling and sought to identify the values, attitudes, behaviour and professional 
interests of those involved. The interviews were translated (as required) and 
transcribed and organised around these themes. Where possible the interview 
material was compared to the secondary information published by the UCI. The 
discussion section of the paper which follows is structured around those same themes. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Changes in Stakeholder Nature  
 
As set out earlier in the paper, the structure of professional road cycling directly 
involves a number of separate stakeholders: race organisers, teams, riders, sponsors 
and governing bodies. Prior to the inception of the Pro Tour, there was widespread 
acceptance from the various stakeholders, including the organisers of the Grand 
Tours, that there was a need for structural change to create a proper hierarchy of 
events. Road cycling was seen as fragmented which restricted its opportunities to 
develop as a sport and to prosper financially. To increase its public visibility and 
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attractiveness to broadcasters in particular, there was a recognised need to improve 
the coherence and presentation of the product. To facilitate this commercial 
deepening, it was acknowledged that it was essential to attract the top riders to the 
big races:  
 
… we had started to pile up the competitions and there wasn’t much point to it 
any more. It was time to start again and to make some kind of reform that would 
make high level cycling more visible to the public and the media. Why? To 
conquer television, which is the base of everything. If you are shown on 
television, you’ll get sponsored (interview with Jean Marie Le Blanc, former CEO 
of the Tour de France, May 2006)  
 
… the idea of increasing the quality of cycling is right and current. Otherwise we 
risk being left behind and as a result we’ll lose market share, opportunities – 
everything (interview with Mauro Vegni, Director of Organisation, RCS Sport, 
September 2006) 
 
Historically, the UCI had acted as a traditional regulatory body within professional 
road cycling: licensing racers and races, the provision of referees and adjudicators, and 
the enforcement of disciplinary rules, most notably for doping. In the wider sporting 
environment, there have been changes in the political economy of Global Sporting 
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Organisations (GSOs). One example of this has been moves by some GSOs to lessen 
their financial dependence on national associations and/or member clubs, a move 
often predicated on their control of a hallmark event (Forster & Pope, 2003). In 
contrast, as the UCI does not control major events in the professional road cycling 
calendar (for example, the Tour de France is controlled by the private company, 
ASO); it continues to be financially dependent on national cycling associations. 
Notwithstanding the UCI’s legitimacy as a governing body, the fragmented structure 
and the multiple stakeholder groups found in professional road cycling, mean that its 
influence has been relatively limited.  
 
Through the Pro Tour, the UCI has sought to position itself more centrally in the 
network (Rowley, 1999); seeking to change its nature and position as part of the 
process of trying to drive change in professional road cycling. The UCI has sought to 
justify its changed role in terms of being for the good of the sport, i.e. the change 
process and its position therein enables the governing body to focus on improving 
professional road cycling’s position and prominence in the global sport market place; 
facilitating its sports development role and enabling the sport and its stakeholders to 
prosper financially.  
 
The rationale basically is that sport is sport is sport. …  We can never forget that. 
But by the same token at the top level, sport is also to some extent ... business … 
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commerce.   … we are in competition with other sports; we are in competition for 
television … the more the sport gets into the public arena, the better for the 
possibilities of development of the sport. … 
But we don’t have a commercial interest in terms of making money out of this.  
Our focus is purely on the sport, the development of the sport and we make the 
decisions – objective decisions – related to the development of the sport.  All the 
different stakeholders have to accept that (interview with Pat McQuaid, UCI 
President, June 2006). 
 
But its motivation to change and for change may also be characterised in more 
instrumental terms and contrary to the views set out above. In particular, it has been 
argued that the UCI viewed the Pro Tour as the route to positioning itself as a more 
direct financial beneficiary from the revised structure of road cycling, indirectly 
assisting it to fulfill its aspirations for cycling as a whole.  
 
It’s there [the Pro Tour] that the UCI has transformed its vocation – from 
federation which should protect and defend, provide rules and regulations, into a 
commercial machine (interview with Mauro Vegni, RCS Sport, September 2006). 
 
Certainly the UCI’s strategy for change has emphasised commercial considerations: 
first, collective benefits arising out of the philosophy of excellence that underpinned 
 26
the Pro Tour (interview with Pat McQuaid, UCI President, June 2006), and second, 
individual benefits, particularly financial, arising from the Pro Tour. For example, the 
financial certainty arising out of the closed-structure of the Pro Tour and the 
existence of four-year licences was clearly attractive to teams, sponsors and riders and 
highlights the importance of commercialism.  
 
All we want to do with the Pro Tour is create new opportunities to improve the 
situation of the licence holders (interview with Alain Rumpf, UCI Pro Tour 
Manager, June 2006). 
 
From the riders’ point of view, the Pro Tour has brought quite a few things … 
more financial status and more security because if the team sponsors are sure to 
have a contract for 3 or 4 years [then] it is easier for the riders to negotiate 
contracts for 3 or 4 years. [And] as there is more money, the contracts are of more 
financial value (interview with Daniel Malbranque, Secretary General, CPA 
(Professional Cyclists’ Association), November 2006)  
 
For the teams and sponsors, it is a great thing because it means that for the period 
…[that you have a licence] you have no concerns about whether you will be 
participating in the Tour de France … it’s the same for the sponsors … it is certain 
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that their team jersey will be in the Tour so they are happy (interview with 
Franck Trajber, Administrative and Financial Director, Cofidis, December 2006). 
 
We’re making decisions or asking for support or advice to make decisions which 
are to the benefit of the stakeholders, not to our benefit but to the benefit of the 
stakeholders and all the sponsors and the teams and the riders. At the end of the 
day if this thing grows and grows and cycling gets more coverage from television 
and therefore more money coming into it, it is all the stakeholders who benefit 
from that additional money (interview with Pat McQuaid, UCI President, June 
2006). 
 
The importance of commercialism in explaining behaviour and positioning within a 
network has also been observed in other sports, notably European club football where 
structural change in the UEFA Champions’ League has been driven by financial 
considerations, in particular the distribution of media income and the desire of the 
major European clubs to guarantee their participation in the competition’s lucrative 
later stages (Holt, 2002). More specifically, in their study of sports networks in Irish 
sport, Wolfe et al. (2002) demonstrated the success of satellite television in taking a 
more central position in the network as a consequence of its role as a distributor of 
revenue within the network.   
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One issue that is highlighted in this type of exchange is the homogeneity of 
stakeholder groups. For example, while organisers of smaller races like the Dauphiné-
Libéré were in favour of the proposed UCI Pro Tour as it dramatically improved the 
quality of riders and teams taking part (interview with Daniel Malbranque, Secretary 
General, CPA, November 2006), as will be seen in the following section, resistance to 
change came from the organisers of major events and races who saw the Pro Tour as 
weakening their control over participation in their events. This difference of opinion 
emphasises one criticism of stakeholder theory; its implicit assumption that priorities 
within role-based stakeholder groups are relatively homogeneous (Wolfe & Putler, 
2002).  
 
A related issue is stakeholder representation. Clearly, all race organisers do not share 
the same objectives, yet the management and governance structure within which 
professional road cycling operates (both pre- and post- Pro Tour) involves umbrella 
groups set up to represent all race organisers (AIOCC), all teams (AIGCP) and all 
riders (CPA) (see Figure 1). The governance challenges are exacerbated by the fact 
that these umbrella groups draw their representation directly from the race 
organisers, teams and riders, with the result that particular individuals can be placed 
in situations where their organisational position (e.g. as a race organiser) is in conflict 
with the position of the umbrella organisation. The following extract from the 
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minutes of the meeting of the PCC held in Bardolino del Garda in October 2004 
highlights precisely the problem of stakeholder representation:   
 
UCI Pro Tour: Project Progress Report 
Jean Marie Le Blanc and Carmine Castellano made no comment at this meeting on 
Grand Tours.  They would be taking part on behalf of the AIOCC [umbrella 
organisation representing all race organisers] and not on behalf of ASO [organiser 
of The Tour de France and Le Blanc’s employer] and RCS [organiser of the Giro 
d’Italia and Castellano’s employer] respectively. 
 
Changes in power  
 
One stated objective behind the Pro Tour was to increase the financial rewards 
available to all those within the sport. A key issue here is the extent to which 
stakeholders consider this at the institutional level - for the good of the sport - or 
from a narrower, but rational, stakeholder self-interest, focusing more on their power 
and control over the generation and distribution of revenue and their human capital. 
To some within different stakeholder groups (teams, sponsors and riders), part of the 
appeal of the new structure was that it challenged the power of the organisers of the 
major races, ASO (organisers of the Tour de France) and to a lesser extent RCS 
(organisers of the Giro d’Italia) and Unipublic (organisers of the Vuelta), whose 
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influence arose out of their historical control of starting places in their events. Under 
the previous structure, securing a place in the Tour de France, was often crucial to the 
financial viability of teams, sponsors and riders. In this context, however, 
notwithstanding the collective benefits that had encouraged the early stakeholder 
dialogue and appetite for change, it is perhaps unsurprising that ultimately the major 
race organisers interpreted the Pro Tour as a challenge to their autonomy and to their 
ability to manage their businesses: 
 
Over the past two years … [the UCI] has made a huge mistake – thinking that it 
had power over everything and everyone and that it could even manage things 
that historically were the rights of other individual organisations (Mauro Vegni, 
RCS Sport, September 2006).  
 
And on the other hand we didn’t want to lose - not necessarily money – but our 
savoir-faire and experience.  We have been owners of the brand of the Tour de 
France for 100 years.  I don’t see why tomorrow we shouldn’t still be doing our 
jobs (Jean Marie Le Blanc, Tour de France, May 2006).   
 
Equally unsurprising was their decision to try to use their power to block change and 
to preserve their positions. One example of this was ASO’s refusal to allow all of the 
UCI Pro Tour licensed teams to take part in the 2007 Tour de France by banning the 
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Unibet team from its events, including the Tour de France (Cycling News, 2007)1. 
More fundamentally, the decision of ASO, RCS and Unipublic to withdraw their races 
from the 2008 Pro Tour is perhaps the ultimate demonstration of power (Whittle, 
2007); a reminder to the UCI, teams, riders and sponsors of their control over the 
sport’s most financially lucrative events. More generally, where power and authority 
are threatened as a result of potential change, resistance is predictable even where 
such change could be beneficial to the sport as a whole (Patti, 1974).  
 
A central aspect of the dispute between race organisers and the UCI is one common in 
other areas of sports business – the putative conflicts between sporting, social and 
financial objectives. One example of this is the UEFA Champions’ League, one of the 
most lucrative financial competitions in club sport, but also a competition in which 
being a champion on the field of play in a domestic league is no longer sufficient (in 
the case of countries from smaller media market places), or necessary (in the case of 
countries with larger media market places) and in which the distribution of financial 
rewards is only in part a function of sporting success (Morrow, 2003).  This aspect is 
of particular significance in professional road cycling given that events like the Tour 
and the Giro have always had a commercial dimension to them, and have always been 
organised by private sector businesses. In this context, the depiction by 
                                                 
1 The following year, ASO refused to allow another Pro Tour licensed team, Astana, to take part in the 
2008 Tour de France, citing previous drug-related scandals in the team. This decision was taken despite 
the fact that Astana is the team for which the winner of the 2007 Tour de France, Alberto Contador. 
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representatives of ASO and RCS of the UCI as being financially motivated and of 
losing sight of its legitimate role are worthy of note: 
 
One of the aspects of the break-up was … the fact that the UCI has developed a 
more economic role rather than political or sports-focused (interview with Mauro 
Vegni, RCS Sport, September 2006)  
 
This view of the behaviour of the UCI is consistent with what Forster and Pope 
(2003) describe as an ends-means inversion by GSOs, the hypothesis being that over 
time, governing bodies move away from narrow sporting objectives for which they 
have legitimacy, instead focusing on more economically-oriented organisational ends 
which allow them to assert their control over the sport. As discussed previously, this 
process has been more difficult for the UCI, as it does not control a hallmark event. 
While the UCI Pro Tour offers some opportunity for the UCI to prioritise its financial 
objectives, more importantly, it provides a mechanism for it to assert its control over 
the business of professional road cycling (and over the major race organisers), rather 
than acting simply as the regulator of sporting elements of their professional road 
races.  
 
In contrast, the major race organisers are keen to emphasise two things, first, that 
their role in professional cycling and in the network has not changed and second, that 
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their role is, and always has been, about something broader than finance or even 
sport, emphasising aspects of their races’ social and cultural capital.  
 
The Tour de France belongs to every French person, to every region. … The 
Interior Minister – and I understand him – considers that the Tour de France is 
part of French national heritage; something important for the image of France 
(interview with Jean Marie Le Blanc, Tour de France, May 2006).  
 
… in Italy, we represent cycling so we also have some political responsibility.  If 
we were simply a straightforward commercial organisation, we would organise 
the Giro and maybe a few other events that brought profits in, but since we also 
have this political duty [to represent and promote one of Italy’s national sports], 
we also organise a series of events where …very often we lose money.  We take 
money from the Giro funds to subsidise other areas of activity (Interview with 
Mauro Vegni, RCS Sport, September 2006).  
 
Arguably, the major race organisers are seeking to defend their position within the 
network by invoking wider social considerations; seeking to position themselves as 
something more than commercially-focused business people. A similar tactic has been 
used by UEFA, European football’s governing body, in its defence of its Champions’ 
League, where it has emphasised the solidarity payments made to support financially 
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weaker clubs and member associations (Morrow, 2003). One other consideration is 
human capital, or perhaps more accurately the role of personalities. Power can be at 
the level of individuals or organisations, or through positions (Slack & Parent, 2006) 
and previous studies of business behaviour and governance in sports like football have 
stressed the importance of personality (Morrow, 2003). While the development of the 
Pro Tour has emphasised issues as diverse as sports development, competitive quality, 
business structure and governance, fundamentally its developments and the 
subsequent conflict have also been about the power and influence of key individuals 
within those stakeholders.  
 
There has been so much that has happened between Verbruggen [previous 
president of the UCI] and Patrice Clerc [Head of ASO] and now Pat McQuaid 
[current President of the UCI] and Patrice Clerc.  … It has become a battle 
between two men, two individuals rather than the organizations they represent 
(interview with Franck Trajber, Cofidis, December 2006). 
 
Stakeholder coalitions  
 
Given the initial desire for change expressed by stakeholders within the network, 
ostensibly the emphasis on stakeholder dialogue as the process through which to 
achieve change was entirely rational. This is consistent with Henry and Lee’s (2004) 
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views on systemic governance, where they stress that major policy change is only 
possible if there is negotiation and compromise between stakeholders in the network.  
At the same time, the potential for stakeholders to build coalitions within a network, 
strengthening relationships between sources of dependence, as a way of challenging 
long-standing, powerful interests has also been commented on in the literature 
(Benson, 1975; Podolny & Page, 1998). In the case of professional road cycling, the 
inception of the Pro Tour has acted as a catalyst for the teams, the sponsors and, to a 
lesser extent, the riders, to begin to coalesce with a view to challenging the power of 
race organisers like ASO. While the previous structure resulted in teams, and by 
extension sponsors and riders, having a dependency relationship with the major race 
organisers which controlled entry to their events, the Pro Tour structure is based on a 
transparent and predictable system of participation and financial reward; 
characteristics that were appealing to teams, sponsors and riders.  
 
Both Frooman (1999) and Neville and Menguc (2006) stress the opportunities for 
stakeholder alliances to secure influence, in ways that individual stakeholders can 
not. The UCI’s approach of focusing on stakeholder dialogue to facilitate change has 
encouraged some stakeholders to work together to try to reduce uncertainty and to 
influence change, even when faced by resistance from powerful stakeholders within 
the network. The initial willingness of the teams and the sponsors to side with the 
UCI and to challenge the established power and authority of the race organisers has 
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clearly altered the nature of the network and the interconnectedness between its 
actors. One example is the relationship between the teams, to whom Pro Tour 
licenses are awarded, and team sponsors, which fund the teams. While the teams have 
traditionally played a part in the governance of road cycling through the umbrella 
organisation, AIGCP, the sponsors were previously largely disengaged from 
governance and decision-making. However, their enthusiasm for the marketing and 
television possibilities arising from the Pro Tour resulted in them agreeing to assume 
a stronger and more direct role within the ProTour (First Edition Cycling News, 
2005). Moreover, the perception of the teams and sponsors beginning to organise 
themselves and assert their influence over the sport in other ways has been noted by 
other stakeholders: 
 
[the teams will] fight to hang on to [their Pro Tour licences].  … they are in the 
middle of setting themselves up [like] the G14 in football.  We can see the idea 
starting to form within the teams to build a kind of force against us [the race 
organisers].  And perhaps against the UCI as well, I don’t know (interview with 
Jean Marie Le Blanc, Tour de France, May 2006). 
 
Interestingly, at the same time some stakeholders have argued that coalitions of 
mutual interest have also emerged on the other side of the dispute, emphasising again 
the contested nature of the change process: 
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I am convinced that the Pro Tour is already dead.  The big tours are no longer 
alone now.  They have … the 4 most important federations … the Spanish, 
French, Italian and Belgian [on side]….  This … should make the UCI stop, sit 
down and take a minute to think about things.  To go to war with the 3 main 
tours means they’re already taking on a big war.  To do so with the 3 or 4 most 
important national federations is a huge risk (Mauro Vegni, RCS Sport, September 
2006). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Commercialism has been an important factor within the professional road cycling 
network virtually since its inception. Indeed, within the race organisers’ stakeholder 
group, the central role and powerful position of organisers like ASO have arisen 
largely through their ability to control access to their commercial events and as a 
result of the subsequent distribution of finance. But what this study has shown is that 
while commercialism continues to be an important factor in the workings of the 
professional road cycling network, change within the network has been driven by 
stakeholders other than the major stage race organisers, seeking to alter their position 
within the network by adopting a more commercially-focused approach. In keeping 
with the changing political economy of global sporting organisations more generally, 
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this is particularly the case for the governing body, the UCI, which through its 
advocacy of the Pro Tour as a form of commercial deepening, has sought both to 
strengthen its position within the network and to develop its links with other 
stakeholders.  
  
It now appears that the UCI Pro Tour as originally conceptualised has failed: no ASO-
managed events have been included in 2007/08, meaning that the sport’s highest 
profile events like the Tour de France will be run separately as part of the European 
calendar. However, the Pro Tour will continue in 2007/08 with new events being 
held in countries like Australia, China and Russia (see Postscript). One interpretation 
of this state of affairs is that the battle has been won by the powerful race organisers 
and hence lost by the UCI, and by the other stakeholders in the network (Whittle, 
2007). But in truth, the reality is more complex.  
 
Irrespective of the precise format of the UCI Pro Tour going forward, the case study 
has demonstrated the application of stakeholder theory and network theory in 
practice. The change process as encouraged by the UCI has involved widespread 
stakeholder dialogue within the network. But, while dialogue is a pre-requisite to 
major policy change within the network, ultimately the acceptance of change within 
a network is dependent on more complex factors like the nature of the individual 
stakeholders, the positioning of stakeholders within that network, the connections 
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between them and, importantly, the distribution of power within the network. The 
readiness of the teams and the sponsors to form an alliance with the UCI has changed 
the nature of the network and the relationships therein, and as a result has challenged 
the position of the major race organisers within the network. To some extent at least, 
power has been dispersed among different stakeholders within professional road 
cycling, such that the substance - if not necessarily yet the form - of the network 
configuration has been altered. In particular, the wider emphasis on commercialism 
has lessened the dependency of stakeholders on race organisers like ASO. 
 
Looking ahead, the dispute surrounding the Pro Tour and the entrenched positions 
taken by individuals and organisations has, to an extent, been overtaken by events. In 
particular, the continuing drugs scandals, most notably in the 2007 Tour de France, 
are threatening both cycling’s sporting credibility and its commercial potential, with a 
number of sponsors and media companies choosing to end their relationships with the 
sport. Paradoxically, these scandals and their financial consequences may end up 
being the channel which forces all of the major stakeholders to work together for 
change and to restore the sport’s credibility. Already some teams, riders and sponsors 
have taken a lead in this; most notably team Slipstream’s zero tolerance policy on 
drugs among its riders and the public anti-drugs pronouncements of younger riders 
like Britain’s Bradley Wiggins. The UCI believe that its attempting to globalize the 
Pro Tour will not only help develop the sport of road cycling but may also have a role 
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to play in dealing with the issue of drugs, challenging the powerful position of a small 
number of race organizers in a small number of countries. For race organizers like 
ASO, it could be argued that from one perspective nothing has changed, but in fact 
everything has changed. ASO events like the Tour de France will be under greater 
scrutiny than ever before and it is clear that it can not afford to stage another race 
overshadowed by drugs-related controversy.  
 
Returning to change and the Pro Tour, the race organisers find themselves at a critical 
juncture: if they are to thrive as business organizations and play a role in developing 
their sport, they need to work with cycling’s other stakeholders to earn their central 
role in the network - rather than assuming it is their’s by historical right.   
 
Postscript 
 
The rift between race organizers ASO and the UCI continues.  In September 2007, in 
a renewed attempt to exert its power as a governing body, the UCI excluded all ASO 
events – including the Tour de France – from the Pro Tour calendar. In place of the 
traditional ‘Classic’ races, such as the Paris-Nice, Flèche Wallone and the Tour de 
France, the UCI were keen to bring a completely new and more global aspect to the 
Pro Tour.  2008 will introduce the Australian ‘Tour Down Under’ as the first Pro Tour 
event to be staged outside Europe.  China and Russia are two of the ‘new’ cycling 
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countries which are reportedly pushing for the opportunity to host major cycling 
races and are reportedly prepared to cover the costs of making them lavish events.  
The attempted internationalization of professional cycling may have come at a timely 
moment for the UCI.  In spite of on-going discussions to resolve the long-running 
dispute between the two organisations, ASO announced in June 2008 that the 2008 
Tour de France would not run under the jurisdiction of the UCI.  Instead, the French 
Cycling Federation will oversee the event and anti-doping controls will be overseen 
by the French Anti-Doping Agency, the AFLD.   
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